- Published on
Learn about JetBrains TeamCity CVE-2023-42793 authentication bypass to RCE.
- Authors
- Name
- Eric Ardiansa
- @eric_ardiansa
What is CVE-2023-42793 ?
CVE-2023-42793 is a critical Vulnerability which affecting the TeamCity Server prior to version 2023.05.4 . TeamCity is a CI/CD platform offer by JetBrains that helps build and test software products. Its available as a cloud service or as an on-premises installation. This vulnerability, originally discovered by Sonar, a software company that provides tools and services for static code analysis to sofware development teams.
TeamCity server version 2023.05.3 and below is prone to an authentication bypass, which allows an unauthenticated attacker to gain remote code execution (RCE) on the server.By default, the vulnerable web interface listens for HTTP connections on TCP port 8111.
The exploitability for this Vulnerability is high, as the product is vulnerable in a default configuration and an attacker can trivially exploit this server with a sequence of cURL commands. This can be happens because TeamCity has insecure handling of particular paths, which enabled the bypassing of authorization protocols and lead to the execution of arbitrary code on the server.
Technical Analysis
In this technical analysis i will use the source from the this website for reference and source to learn about technical side from this vulnerability (e.g) https://attackerkb.com/topics/1XEEEkGHzt/cve-2023-42793/rapid7-analysis and https://www.sonarsource.com/blog/teamcity-vulnerability/.
This root cause of this vulnerability is the RequestInterceptor class at RequestInterceptors.java file. The wildcard path /**/RPC leads to an authentication bypass.
public class RequestInterceptior extends handlerInterceptorAdapter {
.....
.....
Public RequestInterceptor(){
if (list == null )
...
}
....
....
this.myPrehandlingDisabled.addpath("/**" + XmlRpcController.getPathSuffix());
....
....
}
To learn why the wildcard path /**.RPC2 leads to an authentication bypass vulnerability. We must understand what this path does. The TeamCity server is a large Java Spring application, the configuration file C:\TeamCity\webapps\ROOT\WEB-INF\buildServerSpringWeb.xml creates several interceptors, which intercept and potentially modify incoming HTTP requests to the server, one of which calledOnceInterceptors Java bean
<mvc:interceptors>
<ref bean="externalLoadBalancerInterceptor"/>
<ref bean="agentsLoadBalancer"/>
<ref bean="calledOnceInterceptors"/>
<ref bean="pageExtensionInterceptor"/>
</mvc:interceptors>
// calledOnceInterceptors bean is an instance othe JetBrains.buildServer.controllers.interceptors.RequestInterceptor
<bean id="calledOnceInterceptors" class="jetbrains.buildServer.controllers.interceptors.RequestInterceptors">
<constructor-arg index="0">
<list>
<ref bean="mainServerInterceptor"/>
<ref bean="registrationInvitations"/>
<ref bean="projectIdConverterInterceptor"/>
<ref bean="authorizedUserInterceptor"/>
<ref bean="twoFactorAuthenticationInterceptor"/>
<ref bean="firstLoginInterceptor"/>
<ref bean="pluginUIContextProvider"/>
<ref bean="callableInterceptorRegistrar"/>
</list>
</constructor-arg>
</bean>
We can see when constructing the RequestInterceptors instance, several Java beans are passed as a list including authorizedUserInterceptor. These beans will be added to the myInterceptors list during instatiation
public RequestInterceptors(@NotNull List<HandlerInterceptor> paramList) {
this.myInterceptors.addAll(paramList);
this.myPreHandlingDisabled.addPath("/**" + XmlRpcController.getPathSuffix());
this.myPreHandlingDisabled.addPath("/app/agents/**");
}
The RequestInterceptors instance will then intercept HTTP requests via its prehandle method, as shown in code below. This is where the vulnerability lies.
public final boolean preHandle(HttpServletRequest paramHttpServletRequest, HttpServletResponse paramHttpServletResponse, Object paramObject) throws Exception {
try {
// if we can trigger this code, we will bypass authentication process
if (!requestPreHandlingAllowed(paramHttpServletRequest))
return true; // <--- return early, no authentication checks
} catch (Exception exception) {
throw null;
}
Stack stack = requestIn(paramHttpServletRequest);
try {
if (stack.size() >= 70 && paramHttpServletRequest.getAttribute("__tc_requestStack_overflow") == null) {
LOG.warn("Possible infinite recursion of page includes. Request: " + WebUtil.getRequestDump(paramHttpServletRequest));
paramHttpServletRequest.setAttribute("__tc_requestStack_overflow", this);
Throwable throwable = (new ServletException("Too much recurrent forward or include operations")).fillInStackTrace();
paramHttpServletRequest.setAttribute("javax.servlet.jsp.jspException", throwable);
}
} catch (Exception exception) {
throw null;
}
if (stack.size() == 1)
for (HandlerInterceptor handlerInterceptor : this.myInterceptors) {
try {
if (!handlerInterceptor.preHandle(paramHttpServletRequest, paramHttpServletResponse, paramObject)) // <--- enforce authentication checks :(
return false;
} catch (Exception exception) {
throw null;
}
}
return true;
}
if we can make requestPreHandlingAllowed returns false, the prehandle method will return early which mean we can skip authentication process. However if requestPreHandlingAllowed returns true, the myInterceptors list will be iterated and each interceptor on the lish will be run agains the request. This includes the authorizedUserInterceptor bean which will enforce authentication on the request if needed.
Therefore, if we can send a request to a URL that causes to return false, we can skip authentication process.
Then after examining the requestPreHandlingAllowed code, we see the PathSet myPreHandlingDisabled, which we know to contain the wildcard path /**/RPC2, is used to test the incoming HTTP request’s path.
private boolean requestPreHandlingAllowed(@NotNull HttpServletRequest paramHttpServletRequest) {
try {
if (paramHttpServletRequest == null)
$$$reportNull$$$0(5);
} catch (IllegalArgumentException illegalArgumentException) {
throw null;
}
try {
if (WebUtil.isJspPrecompilationRequest(paramHttpServletRequest))
return false;
} catch (IllegalArgumentException illegalArgumentException) {
throw null;
}
try {
} catch (IllegalArgumentException illegalArgumentException) {
throw null;
}
// the PathSet is here
return !this.myPreHandlingDisabled.matches(WebUtil.getPathWithoutContext(paramHttpServletRequest));
}
This means, any incoming HTTP request that matches the wilcard path /**/RPC2 will not be subjugate to the authentication performed by the beans in the myInterceptors list during RequestInterceptors.preHandle. checks pe
To exploit this vulnerability, attacker need to make request to the following endpoint.
/app/rest/users/id:1/tokens/RPC2. This endpoint is required to exploit the vulnerability. Because this url will bypass authentication checks performed byprehandlemethod./app/rest/users. This endpoint is required by the attacker to create an arbitrary user./app/rest/debug/processes. This endpoint is abuse by attacker to create an arbitrary process. This is where we can inject our arbitrary command to be executed on server.